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Philippe van Parijs's ambitious book Real Freedom For All? What (If 
Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (1995) develops three arguments. First, 
he backs heal freedom for all' as the appropriate goal for the left-of-centre 
in the modern age. Second, he argues that (with modifications) a universal 
basic income at the maximum sustainable rate is the morally most just and 
strategically most effective route to this goal. Third, he contends that 
capitalism provides a more favourable socio-economic framework than 
socialism for achieving a high basic income and thus maximising real 
freedom for all. 
These are big claims and I will try to address each in turn. The political 
upshot is a 'resolutely left-wing variant of Rawlsianism' (p. 297), designed 
to save the 'European model' of capitalism by taking it one stage further (p. 
2). The book is situated in the red-green framework of politics still salient 
in Belgium, where he lives and works, and in other European countries. 
Yet the book is not an easy read, addressing as it does a formidable range 
of issues within political theory and philosophy. Feats of mental 
gymnastics are frequently performed to achieve what some might see as 
modest or obvious or perverse conclusions. The book is a good example of 
the perspective and style of the 'September Group', the 'Non-Bullshit 
Marxism Group', of which Van Parijs is a founder member; or rather, of 
the methodologically individualist, rational-choice side of that group. 
Van Parijs's maximum sustainable basic income has obvious affinities to 
the right of all persons to the 'optimal sustainable level of need 
satisfaction', which Len Doyal and I advocate in A Theory of Human Need. 
Similarly his support for basic-income capitalism has something in 
common with the case I have made for 'socially regulated capitalism' as the 
best immediately feasible framework for 
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optimised need satisfaction (see Chapter 2). Yet these superficial 
similarities mask disagreements over policy and analysis which stem from 
radically different ethical goals and methodologies. I shall try to clarify 
some of these similarities and divergences in the course of this article. 
Theses 
Real freedom for all 
According to Van Parijs, a free society is one that satisfies three conditions 
(p. 25): first, there is some well-enforced structure of rights; second, this 
structure is such that each person owns herself; and third, this structure is 
such that each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do whatever 
she might want to do. It is the third condition, 'maximin opportunity', 
which distinguishes real freedom from formal freedom and it can be 
understood as follows. The person with least opportunities has 
opportunities that are no smaller than those enjoyed by the person with 
least opportunities under any other feasible arrangement. 'The real freedom 
we need to be concerned with is not just the real freedom to choose among 
the various bundles of goods one might wish to consume. It is the real 
freedom to choose among the various lives one might wish to lead' (p. 33). 
In particular, later on, this includes the ability to choose between work and 
leisure. 
It is clear that Van Parijs's approach is close to that of Rawls, and on 
several occasions he acknowledges his debt. More generally he likens his 
approach to that of other left-liberal or liberal-egalitarian or solidaristic 
conceptions of justice, including those of Dworkin, Sen, Arneson and even 
Cohen. All share the general postulate of 'equal respect': that 'what counts 
as a just society should not be determined on the basis of some particular 
substantive conception of the good life' (p. 28). Only a thin theory of the 
good is extolled. When discussing how to make different opportunity sets 
commensurable, Van Parijs rejects assessing them in terms of the welfare 
levels they enable different people to achieve (p. 50). However by 'welfare' 
here he means the utilitarian satisfaction of subjective preferences, not the 
satisfaction of objective needs. Interpreted in this way he rightly points out 
a key difficulty: that people with more extensive and expensive tastes 
would be entitled to a greater share of resources than those who have 
adapted their tastes to their circumstances. This is unjust, except in the case 
of people with real handicaps, an issue he addresses in Chapter 3. 
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An unconditional basic income for all 
The bulk of the book presents an argument for a universal, unconditional 
basic income at the maximum sustainable rate as the surest way of 
maximising real freedom for all (Chapter 2), followed by responses to a 
complication (Chapter 3) and two critiques (Chapter 4 and 5). 
The opportunities component of real freedom for all justifies a radical 
shift from the traditional welfare state to an unconditional basic income: 
'an income paid by the government to each full member of society (1) even 
if she is not willing to work, (2) irrespective of her being rich or poor, (3) 
whoever she lives with, and (4) no matter which part of the country she 
lives in' (p. 35). Different forms of welfare system in some countries of the 
industrialised world provide a guaranteed minimum income to all or nearly 
all citizens, of a greater or lesser amount, but none of these is 
unconditional in all four of the above senses. It is not difficult to see that 
maximin opportunity requires the provision of basic resources as a 
citizenship right, but why an unconditional basic income? 
The argument for no work test is directly derived from maximizing 
opportunities: there should be no constraint on the use of one's time in the 
form of restriction of benefits to those willing to accept employment or 
training. The second feature - no means testing - uses a variety of 
supporting arguments (p. 36). First, an ex-post means-tested (or negative 
income tax) system must entail time lags when the poorest groups are 
vulnerable to real destitution. Furthermore, ignorance or confusion will 
mean that some fail to claim their due resulting in less than 100 per cent 
take-up of benefits (frequently a lot less). Second, the uncertainty of 
conditional benefits restricts claimants' real choices especially in the 
contemporary world of rapidly changing and flexible labour markets. For 
example, it may be too risky to give up regular benefits to take a job which 
may soon disappear or which they may be unable to keep. An ex- ante 
basic income provides a certain material foundation on which life choices 
can firmly rest. Third, the administrative costs of basic income are much 
lower than for means-tested benefits and thus, ceteris paribus, the 
sustainable level of benefit is higher.2 
The final two (un)conditions are less obviously related to real freedom. 
Van Parijs simply observes that there is no reason to make the basic benefit 
dependent on household situation and place of residence. Having ruled out 
welfare outcomes as a criterion, it is no argument that there are economies 
of scale from living in a household with others or that it costs more to live 
in London than the Orkneys. Opportunities to 
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live where or with whom you want are maximised by giving the same 
benefit to everyone. 
The level of benefit should be the highest sustainable amount that could 
be paid to the members of the society concerned. 'Sustainable' has two 
components relating to incentives and ecology. Drawing on his earlier 
innovative work on the 'Laffer curve' with Robert van der Veen, the 
incentives component dictates that the tax rate set to finance basic income 
should be that which maximises the total tax yield. How high this is, and 
thus how high is the sustainable basic income, may well depend on other 
features of the socio-economic regime, and thus on the capitalism-
socialism debate returned to at the end of the book. The complex questions 
raised by environmental constraints and intergen- erational distribution are 
simply and reasonably dealt with by specifying that the next generation 
should be no worse off than the present one. 
Should the benefit be paid in cash, in kind or some combination of the 
two? Not surprisingly, Van Parijs contends that opportunity sets will be 
maximised if it takes the form of a cash benefit. Certain exceptions can be 
made to take account of collective security (e.g. policing), positive 
externalities (e.g. basic education and infrastructure) and excessive costs of 
marketisation (e.g. certain pollution controls). But he prefers to restrict 
these to a narrow list of market failures. In particular he does not accept 
that consumer ignorance and irrationality can justify the direct provision of 
goods and services. So far, so libertarian. Yet Van Parijs recoils from 
taking this position to its logical conclusion. He opposes an initial 
endowment on the lines initially advocated by Thomas Paine because of 
the dangers that misspending in youth will create destitution in old age. He 
assumes 'a universal desire on people's part, when "in their right minds'', to 
protect their real freedom at older ages against the weakness of their will at 
younger ages' (p. 47). And at the end of the book he speculates that the 
experiences of collective creches and hospitals may be necessary to foster 
the 'solidaristic patriotism' that such a generous unconditional basic income 
will require from society's members (p. 231). These qualifications sit 
uneasily alongside his general belief in the rationality of consumer 
preferences. 
In Chapter 3, Van Parijs confronts the problem that the real 
opportunities of the worst off will not be maximised if internal 
endowments are not included, alongside external endowments. Surely a 
person with disabilities will require a higher basic income than a person 
without disabilities if real opportunities for all are to be maximised? Once 
again any 'welfare metric' has been ruled out as a way of handling this, so  
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Van Parijs, like Dworkin before him, confronts a series of hurdles in 
distinguishing the seemingly valid claims of the genuinely handicapped 
from the seemingly invalid claims of those 'with expensive tastes', e.g. a 
nonmusical person with an obsession to play the oboe well. His solution is 
to apply Ackerman's treatment of genetic features to all internal 
endowments. 'A's internal endowment (a vector of talents) dominates B's 
internal endowment if and only if every person (given her own conception 
of the good life) would prefer to have the former than the latter' (p. 73). 
This criterion of 'undominated diversity' should hopefully separate out the 
genuinely handicapped whom nobody would envy from the frustrated oboe 
players. But Van Parijs recognises the rather absurd corollary: that it would 
take only one person to prefer, say, blindness to vision, for any extra 
recompense for the blind to be ruled out. His answer to this is to postulate 
a large, open, pluralistic society with real exit options and an ubiquitous 
mass media (p. 83). This would minimise the chances that offbeat 
preferences would be universal across the social group and thus require 
transfers to enable everyone to travel to Mecca or to play polo. 
It would seem that the principle of undominated diversity acts as a 
constraint on the principle of a maximum sustainable basic income for all 
(p. 75). Van Parijs applies the principle not only to 'the handicapped' but 
also to persons with modest endowments of whatever it takes to make a 
living in the market at the present time. If no one would prefer to have 
these modest talents, then he is driven to accept that some form of 
conditional guaranteed minimum benefit may be the best way of 
compensating this group of poor people. In other words, means testing, 
other forms of capability testing and in kind benefits (p. 259, n. 45) may 
well be the most desirable and effective forms of social policy. Moreover 
these benefits would have first claim on public revenues which would 
mean that in all countries less would be left over for basic income. In 
poorer countries the basic income could well be driven down to zero. Van 
Parijs's lengthy engagement with the problems of internal assets raised by 
Dworkin has left his earlier support of basic income peculiarly exposed. 
Does basic income unjustly favour the 'lazy' (e.g. the surfer shown on 
the front cover of the book) and discriminate against what Van Parijs calls, 
to avoid biased labelling, the 'crazy' (i.e. those who want to get ahead and 
make money)? In Chapter 4 Van Parijs confronts one set of arguments of 
this sort. Musgrave (1974) in an early criticism of Rawls argued that 
implementation of Rawls's maximin favoured those with a high preference 
for leisure. In a later reply, Rawls (1974) switched to the 
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opposite extreme by adding leisure to the list of socio-economic 
advantages governed by the difference principle. The effect of this is to 
rule out any entitlement from public funds for the voluntarily unemployed 
(p. 96). To avoid this, Van Parijs introduces an argument derived in 
different ways from Dworkin and Steiner: an unconditional basic income 
does not unjustly benefit the 'lazy' if the 'crazies' use more external 
resources than they, which will, generally speaking, be the case. To endow 
the two groups with equal external assets will then optimise the real 
freedom of neither group. Thus the users of external assets should be taxed 
and the proceeds used to finance a basic income for all. 
The next and crucial stage in Van Parijs's argument is to contend that 
jobs are the most salient assets in the modern world - more important than 
inherited wealth and skills. Assuming that labour markets do not clear, and 
thus that unemployment and extreme job inequality are permanent features 
of modern political economy, then all jobs should be auctioned to the 
highest bidders. In lieu of this, Van Parijs is led to support, via a series of 
arguments, an income tax on all earnings at the rate which maximises the 
tax yield, not excluding income from self- employment and interest and 
dividends. The result of this long digression is a new justification for the 
twentieth-century tax state, but with the revenues supporting an 
unconditional citizens' income. The argument is heavily reliant on modern 
theories of the efficiency wage and sticky labour markets, and is also 
buttressed by instrumental arguments for basic income in terms of its 
effect on labour-market flexibility. Yet the chapter has been necessary for 
Van Parijs to provide a moral justification for the same end-result in terms 
of maximising opportunities and real freedom. 
Van Parijs then turns to arguments concerning exploitation, which, had 
he not addressed them, might weigh the dice in favour of capitalism in the 
last part of the book. If exploitation is defined in its most general terms as 
'taking unfair advantage of someone else's work' then it is not at all clear 
that basic income makes things better and there is a strong intuition that it 
will make them worse. In the course of addressing this critique he provides 
a dense and wide-ranging survey of recent theoretical writings on 
exploitation, extracting where possible their normative implications for 
basic income. When exploitation is conceived as surplus labour, the ethical 
implications ('to each according to her labour') are, he concludes, 
unattractive since it would favour those workers with higher productivity 
due to better capital endowments. Marx himself saw this principle as 
inferior to, and eventually to be superseded by, the 
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principle of 'to each according to her needs'. Van Parijs then takes us 
through the cerebral pathways of Roemer's theory of exploitation which he 
(roughly) redefines as follows: A is capitalistically exploited if she would 
be better off if, ceteris paribus, society's means of production were equally 
distributed. But the ceteris cannot be paribus, as Roemer recognises. In 
practice the redistribution would entail costs to efficiency which may well 
reduce the welfare of the exploited. Real freedom for all is then maximised 
not by equalising assets and abolishing (Roemer- ian) exploitation, but by 
reducing it to the point where a less exploitative situation becomes worse 
off for the exploited (p. 183). Thus Roemer's approach 'effortlessly 
converges' with Van Parijs's and can lend support to, rather than 
undermine, the case for basic income. 
Van Parijs spends less time confronting the claims of 'justice as desert', 
which attracts widespread popular support in judgements about small- 
scale situations. Why should the Little Red Hen share the bread she made 
with the other animals who refused to help her? One obvious answer is that 
in the real world people have arbitrarily unequal opportunities to bake the 
bread in the first place; another is that she must use scarce resources to 
bake it (including having a job in a bakery). But a basic income funded 
from taxation on incomes would rectify (to the maximum possible extent) 
these problems. If the desert principle is weakened to say that income 
should be positively related to work effort, rather than strictly proportional 
to it, then a basic income would contribute to that goal. Nastier jobs would 
be better rewarded, since the least endowed in the job market would have 
more bargaining power; unpaid labour would indirectly attract some 
reward, and yet the more you work the higher your net income. The 
general conclusion is that basic income would reduce the scope of 
exploitation in society. 
Capitalism, socialism and real freedom 
In the final chapter Van Parijs turns to consider whether capitalism or 
socialism would provide the better framework for maximising basic 
income and thus real freedom for all. They are distinguished in the 
orthodox way according to the private or public ownership of nonhuman 
means of production. But private ownership for Van Parijs can include, as 
well as ownership by capitalists employing waged labour, self-employment 
and worker ownership in cooperatives - an elasticity which might be 
thought to give it an unfair advantage compared to socialism. He is all too 
well aware of the problems in making grand comparisons between entire 
socio-economic regimes: each entails many dimensions other than property 
ownership; there is an essential 
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relativity between patterns of demand, prices and the availability of 
particular goods; and so on. His solution is to compare a hypothetical 
capitalism with a maximum basic income with a similar hypothetical 
socialism. In doing so he relies not only on theory but on the evidence of 
the twentieth century, a process which raises interesting problems but 
which cannot, I think, be avoided. 
The rival claims of capitalism and socialism as frameworks for 
maximising real freedom for all are assessed according to two criteria: 
efficiency and popular sovereignty. As regards the former, the critiques of 
capitalism which are surveyed include its tendency to enhance preferences 
for consumption over leisure; the failures of markets; the expansion of 
unnecessary activities (advertising and surveillance/control costs); its 
tendency to crisis; and unemployment. In several cases the criticisms are 
argued to apply equally to socialism, as with environmental costs or 
control costs. Others are attenuated, he claims, when basic income is 
introduced; for example, basic income helps labour markets to clear, thus 
helping to minimise unemployment, and enables people to choose more 
leisure if they wish. Yet others could be handled with further institutional 
modifications to capitalism: for instance, some form of incomes policy 
and/or a 'workers cooperative economy' to handle 'profit squeeze' 
tendencies to accumulation crisis. On the other side stand the theory and 
historical evidence about the dynamic efficiency of capitalism. The upshot 
is that 'it would be very hard indeed to overturn the strong, empirically 
supported and theoretically motivated presumption in favour of 
capitalism's superior economic efficiency' (p. 220). It can thus support a 
higher level of basic income and hence provide more real freedom than 
socialism. 
The arguments around popular sovereignty relate to criticisms that basic 
income is politically unfeasible or unsustainable in a global capitalist 
context. Capital can strike or flee the country that ventures down this road, 
whereas basic income socialism could collectively continue to allocate 
resources to investment. Even if the level of basic income it could provide 
is lower than that under capitalism, at least it would be achievable and 
sustainable. Against this Van Parijs questions whether capital would be so 
hostile to basic income once its economic benefits were appreciated (the 
'new marriage of justice and efficiency'). He also points out that the 
constraints of international competition will operate on any feasible form 
of socialism, unless we reverse moves towards a global economy. 
Van Parijs concludes by calling for a global basic income: real freedom 
for all must take the 'all' literally. In the face of profound pressures, 
constraints and inertia this will require, on the one hand, 'democratic 
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scale-lifting' - the extension of democracy to supranational, ultimately 
world, levels - and, on the other hand, the fostering of 'solidaristic 
patriotism' to motivate the potential net contributors to basic income. The 
struggle for socialism is a dead end; that for basic income capitalism has 
all to play for. 
Critiques 
Opportunities and needs 
Having summarised the main arguments, let me now treat each of the three 
themes of Van Parijs's book in turn beginning with real freedom. He rejects 
the 'welfarist' argument that freedom is enhanced by enabling a person to 
do whatever she wants to do, as opposed to whatever she might want to do, 
on the grounds that this enhancement can be achieved through the 
appropriate manipulation of her preferences. The 'Rousseau solution', of 
collectively specifying what are desirable preferences, is rejected as 
inconsistent with a free society (p. 18). He goes on to acknowledge that 
real freedom interpreted as the size of a person's opportunity set is very 
close to Sen's approach. Yet in a footnote he also rejects Sen's suggestion 
that 'the category of capabilities is the natural candidate for reflecting the 
idea of freedom to do' on the unconvincing grounds that 'I shall want to 
contrast permissions and abilities as two sets of factors affecting the size of 
the opportunity set' (p. 240, n. 45). So any objective metric of welfare is 
rejected. 
Yet as Barry (1997) has pointed out this leads to some perverse 
outcomes. We have noted that the special needs of people with disabilities 
can only be identified and compensated if everyone in the society would 
prefer not to be in that situation. This is simply unjust. 'Any discussion of 
special needs has an ineliminable reference to a normal level of activity. 
This level is subject to some sort of collective determination.' However, 
Barry goes on to say that this level 'may be expected to vary, within certain 
limits, from one society to another'. This immediately raises the problems 
of relativism and of perverse societal preferences. In China and some other 
East Asian societies, people with physical and mental disabilities are 
regarded as bringing shame on their families and are frequently confined, 
neglected or even put to death. Are we then to respect these collective 
preferences? And if 'special needs' can be abstracted from the Van Parijs's 
individualist framework, why not the 'unanimously recognised necessities' 
(p. 76) of all of us? 
The alternative to the methodological individualism of Van Parijs and 
others close to rational-choice Marxism, is not an equally flawed 
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functionalism or holism but a recognition of the social dimension of 
individual action. In A Theory of Human Need, Len Doyal and I argue that 
physical health and autonomy are universal prerequisites for any person's 
successful participation in whatever form of life she finds herself in, or 
chooses to live in. These basic needs can be and are collectively identified 
on a global scale, though our understanding of them evolves through time. 
Their satisfaction requires the provision of satisfiers, whose characteristics 
can be similarly specified. Van Parijs's aim of maximising the real 
opportunity sets of all people requires, we would argue, the optimal 
satisfaction of these objective basic needs. Developing an argument that 
socially imposed duties imply rights, we conclude that there is a powerful 
case for social rights - specifically, universal substantive rights to the 
minimum bundle of satisfiers necessary to achieve that optimal level of 
basic need satisfaction. Such a welfarist approach overcomes the problems 
which Van Parijs faces in recognising and compensating special needs 
without succumbing to the utilitarian problem of 'expensive tastes'. 
Furthermore, our approach firmly ties rights to duties whereas Van 
Parijs generally divorces the two. Again, the starting point is that 
individuals are born and grow in social environments. We all start off as 
babies and children and learn what we are capable of in interaction with 
others in social groups. In turn the cohesion and good functioning of such 
collectivities requires that certain societal preconditions must be met. 
These include the production of satisfiers to meet individual needs and the 
care and socialisation of children. Contributing to such productive work is 
a constitutive activity common to all cultures. Cooperative labour, 
including unpaid care work, is a defining feature of all social groups above 
a certain minimum size. The principle that all able-bodied persons should 
be enabled to contribute, and should then actually contribute, to the 
common wealth is a powerful component of intuitions about justice. 'Work' 
is not simply the antonym to 'leisure' and Van Parijs's liberal neutrality 
between the two is not morally convincing. Participation in universally 
socially significant activities, including work, is a crucial contributor to 
autonomy and human welfare. All able- bodied people should have the 
right - and the duty - to contribute to these productive activities. 
Basic income and the welfare state 
Basic income is to be contrasted with conditional state benefits. Van 
Parijs, like many others, assumes these to be means-tested benefits where 
eligibility is dependent upon the recent or current resources of 
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the beneficiary. In fact there is another form of conditional benefit far 
more widespread in the modern world - social insurance, where the benefit 
is related to both employment status and past contributions paid into the 
scheme. Both social insurance and social assistance can be more or less 
hedged around by other categorical conditions, such as those listed earlier. 
Indeed these categorical conditions also apply to so- called 'universal' 
benefits like Child Benefit or Disability Living Allowance in the UK. 
Basic income is unique in doing away with both categorical restrictions 
(excepting some form or nationality and/or residence qualifications) and 
means-testing or contribution-testing. 
It is agreed by all that basic income would be very expensive. How 
expensive is strictly impossible to say since its introduction would be an 
epochal event which would affect most other relevant parameters including 
the performance of the economy. Purdy (1996) estimates it would require a 
tax rate of between 33 per cent and 60 per cent. Remembering that all other 
non-cash government social expenditure, as well as non-social functions, 
would need to be financed in addition, it is clear that the fiscal feasibility 
of basic income is, to say the least, uncertain. It would have to provide 
enormous moral and strategic advantages over current and alternative 
welfare policies to justify such a risky and costly upheaval. 
Let me then consider the advantages over conditional benefit schemes 
cited by Van Parijs, in particular versions of negative income tax. In doing 
so, I will draw on a comparative study of social assistance in OECD 
countries. (Eardley et al., 1996b, ch. 1). In particular, I want to consider 
whether the Australian model of universal means-tested benefits offers an 
attractive alternative. Too often comparisons with conditional benefits is 
based on the US or UK models. But these are but two of seven distinct 
forms of social assistance we have identified in the OECD world. What we 
call the US 'public assistance state' - an extensive and interrelated set of 
means-tested benefits arranged in a hierarchy of acceptability and stigma 
providing low to very low benefits - is indeed no model to emulate. But in 
the selective welfare system of Australia (and New Zealand) all benefits 
are means-tested. If any model can be used as a reference point for the 
conditional welfare state it is the Australian model. 
In brief, Australia provides all citizens with entitlements to a 
comprehensive set of benefits. These rights are backed by an appeals 
system which extends to the High Court. The means tests are relatively 
generous: they provide extensive disregards for assets and earnings and the 
benefit withdrawal rates of around 50 per cent provide modest work 
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incentives. The means tests apply to husbands and wives or to couples 
living together as man and wife, but entitlements and payments are made 
individually so that each partner can receive half the assessed rate in their 
own right (since 1995 some tests have also been individualised). Basic 
benefit levels are relatively generous whether measured in absolute terms 
or relative to Australian average incomes, and they are roughly equal 
across groups. Various forms of emergency relief are available to meet 
urgent needs. Since all benefits are means-tested there is little or no stigma 
attached to claiming them. Administrative costs amount to 3 per cent of the 
total social security bill. At first glance, some of the more obvious failures 
attributable to conditional schemes would seem to be absent in Australia. 
To what extent does the Australian model maximise real freedom? 
There are two clear drawbacks. First, the remaining conditions do restrict 
options and can involve some intrusion into private lives. Unemployed 
people must demonstrate regularly that they have actively sought work 
during the previous fortnight; data matching and risk- based selection 
techniques are used to target clients known to have a high correlation with 
incorrect payment who can then be more closely scrutinised. Basic income 
would avoid all such surveillance. Second, means-testing is, to use 
Goodin's (1992) term, 'presumptuous' in the assumptions it makes about 
people's behaviour and preferences. It is vulnerable to both factual error 
and social change. In today's world of fragmenting labour markets, where 
people and families mix and match formal work and informal activity, it 
becomes ever more difficult to track and assess people's means and thus 
their entitlements. And to the extent that it forces traditional assumptions 
about work and family on applicants it restricts the opportunities they can 
enjoy - as does much contemporary social insurance when it presupposes 
that 'everyone is either in work or is in a stable, long-term liaison with 
someone else who is' (Goodin 1992: p. 198). Basic income is the least 
presumptuous income support policy. 
These are powerful arguments against existing models of welfare and in 
favour of basic income. Before looking at the downside let me just point 
out that these arguments are more strategic or consequentialist than ethical. 
They play a minor role in Van Parijs's book, dedicated as it is to 
constructing en ethical defence of basic income. 
A crucial and attractive part of Van Parijs's case is that in today's world 
decent jobs are among the scarcest and most valuable of assets. As White 
(1996) points out, he is in fact arguing that everyone has a right to a job, to 
a share of the available employment in society, but he is claiming that 
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an ethical way of giving substance to this right is to tax job rents and 
redistribute them as a universal basic income. However, these two stages 
of the argument are contradictory. A right to work can be justified in two 
ways: reciprocity and 'brute bad luck'. The first I have argued above - that 
every able-bodied person has the obligation to contribute to the 
community's welfare. If this is so it behoves society to enable people so to 
contribute, whether through productive or reproductive work. The second 
justification for a right to work is that people should not be excluded from 
participating in such socially necessary activities through the brute bad 
luck of lacking external or internal assets. White argues that both these 
reasons justify giving people a right to work but do not justify an 
unconditional basic income - quite the reverse. Basic income directly 
contradicts the principle of reciprocity by giving benefit to those who 
choose to surf all day. And it is too indiscriminatory to compensate for 
brute bad luck since the voluntarily unemployed will receive it alongside 
the involuntarily unemployed. The appropriate policy is then to give all 
citizens a real right to work and to tie benefits to such participation. 
This connects with another critique of basic income. As Goodin 
recognises, basic income is also presumptuous. It does not fully recognise 
that the source of income may provide benefits independent of the income 
itself. Participation in productive activity, as well as contributing to 
collective welfare, is a crucial component of self-respect, contributes to 
cognitive development and provides a site for purposeful socialisation. 
These benefits from participating in socially significant activities are 
abstracted from in a calculus of choice between work and leisure. Basic 
income also assumes that, with a few exceptions, cash benefits are superior 
to citizenship-based social services and that compensation is more 
important than prevention of disutilities through regulation. In practice a 
combination of conditional benefits, job subsidies, training and capital 
grants may well be more desirable. A needs- based approach supports a 
more mixed package of policies. What is more, in the light of the 
horrendous expense of basic income, the reality of a generous basic 
income would be a welfare state impoverished in all other respects. 
More generally, basic income advocates are akin to neoclassical 
economists in their almost evangelical advocacy of a particular policy. Yet 
so much policy analysis shows that there is no one-to-one relationship 
between policy instruments and outcomes. It also shows the importance of 
inherited institutions and political cultures in selecting policy instruments 
and in affecting their transformation into welfare outcomes. 
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Institutions do not figure very much in Van Parijs's book, reflecting again 
the methodological individualism which underpins his work. Above, I 
deliberately compare the real-world situation in Australia today with what 
is still a counterfactual model. Such a comparison is unflattering to the real 
world and I am not advocating the Australian model as it stands or arguing 
that it suffers no defects. I have done so to show that even in the 
inhospitable world of the mid-1990s there were alternatives which perform 
respectably - including by the light of real freedom - and which are fiscally 
and politically feasible. 
Capitalism (s) and basic income 
Much of Van Parijs's defence of the potential of capitalism as the best 
framework for promoting basic income I find persuasive. After 1989 
capitalism is 'the only game in town'. But the game can be played 
according to different rules and here once again institutional precision is 
required. One of the attractions of basic income to Van Parijs, I suspect, is 
that it requires less demanding institutional preconditions than any of the 
alternatives. However, the discussion in the last chapter begins to disabuse 
us of this rosy view. Basic income capitalism may well require, we learn, 
corporatist-style incomes policies and/or a 'share economy' along the lines 
of Weitzman and Meade and/or even workers' cooperatives, where labour 
employs capital rather than vice versa. The last is a radical development 
which many of us would not label as a variant of capitalism, but let that be. 
The problem is that these institutional specifications are bolted on in an ad 
hoc fashion to basic income capitalism and the complex relations between 
these elements and others are not addressed. Fair enough, you may feel, at 
the end of a long and dense book; Van Parijs cannot be expected to deal 
with everything. 
However this institutional indeterminacy is an integral feature of Van 
Parijs's whole approach. Real freedom focuses attention on opportunity 
sets and opportunity sets focus attention on a basic cash income. Somehow 
all the other messiness of contemporary social policy can be subsumed and 
tidied away with these conceptual tools. Now some supporters recognise 
the problems here. Purdy (1996), for example, sees basic income, or 
Citizens' Income, as a regime; 'an ongoing field of debate rather than a 
settled programme'. But then its distinctiveness from existing welfare 
policies is muddied and the one-to-one link which Van Parijs claims with 
the ethic of freedom for all is broken. 
If objective human needs are the subject of our enquiry, then the 
auditing of socio-economic regimes cannot be so one-dimensional. In 
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a similar exercise to Van Parijs's comparative evaluation of capitalism and 
socialism I found it necessary to use six criteria (Gough 1994). My 
conclusion was that a capitalist system which combines state regulation 
and negotiated coordination between collective actors is the best feasible 
framework to secure the optimum satisfaction of human needs (though I 
did not also consider other forms of socialism such as market socialism). 
Of course my goals and the questions asked differed from Van Parijs's. The 
point is that the task of evaluating the contribution of socio-economic 
regimes to ethical goals, whatever they are, is likely to be 
multidimensional and messy. Similarly the solutions will rarely conform to 
one policy instrument, whether that be deregulated markets or basic 
income. This does not mean that the ethical evaluation of socioeconomic 
arrangements is too hazardous to contemplate. It does mean that in the real 
world of different forms of capitalism there will be more than one road to 
its moral reconstruction. 
Notes 
1 In discussing the extent to which Rawls's difference principle endorses an 
unconditional basic income, Van Parijs also notes that his 'social bases of self-
respect' are harmed by stigmatising work- and means-testing (p. 95). But this case 
for basic income appears not to follow from his real freedom approach. Indeed Van 
Parijs acknowledges this when concluding that conditional benefits may be more 
appropriate to compensate for poor internal assets, including difficulty in obtaining 
work. 
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